THE THEORY OF AUTOCHTONOUS ZIONISM IN POLITICAL DISCOURSES IN ISRAEL 1961-1967

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ABSTRACT

The premise of this investigation conceives of Western colonization as the central factor shaping modern history and contemporary geopolitics. In a local context, it perceives of the Zionist project from its inception as colonial, created by European Jews, supported by western powers and based upon perceived civilizational supremacy of western modernity. The Zionist movement affected not only the fate of Palestinian Arabs, but also the native Jewish population and Jewish migrants from Muslim countries to Eretz Israel/Palestine. This research follows political organizations consisting of non-European Jews, autochthonous in the Middle Eastern region, named here Oriental and Sephardic Jews. This research examines Sephardic and Oriental political debates that resisted the colonial postulates of the Zionist state. First, the genealogy of these debates since the beginning of Zionist settlement at the end of the 19th century is presented. This is followed by a description of the fragmentation that the establishment of the state of Israel, as a European enclave in its region, caused these autochthonous Jews. Together these elements form the historical layout of sociological inquiry into a particular discourse of autochthonous Zionism in the 1960s, as it developed on the pages of “In the Battle”, a cultural-political journal.

Keywords: Sephardim; Oriental Jews; Political Movements; Decoloniality.

JEL Classification: N95

1. INTRODUCTION

The Zionist movement was established in Europe at the end of the 19th century as a European Jewish national movement, setting the modernization of the Jewish nation as one of its objectives. It aimed to make a name for the Jews as “a people like all others”, seeking in this quest to imitate other European nations (Raz-Krakotzkin, 1998). The movement organized emigration of Jews from Europe in order to settle Eretz Israel/Palestine2, situated on the Eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. The way to realize the Zionist national ambitions involved the exclusion of non-Jews; and the way to realize its Eurocentric-modern3 ambitions included the subjugation of non-European Jews. It is on this basis that several authors have referred to Zionism as a settler colonial movement (Zureik, 1979; Shaffir, 1993; Wolfe, 2006; Massad, 2007). The Zionist colonial violence was directed at the native Palestinian Arab population as well as the native Jewish population and Jewish migrants from Muslim countries (Shohat, 1988). The latter categories are known as Oriental or Sephardic Jews, while European Jews are known as Ashkenazim. The establishment of the State of Israel by

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2 Though the administrative unit of Palestine did not formally exist from the 12th century and until the British mandate started in 1920, the land will henceforth be referred to at times as Palestine since there are records identifying it or parts of it with this name throughout the period (Porat, 1976). The main Jewish name that was used to describe the same land is Eretz Israel (Land of Israel); therefore, the two names will be applied in this manner to address the land in question before the British Mandate.
3 For further discussion about Eurocentric modernity, and versus transmodernity see Mignolo (2000), Dussel (2003, 2008).
the Zionist movement in 1948 was accompanied by military violence towards Palestinian Arabs, while Oriental and Sephardic Jews have endured what Spivak (1988) called epistemic violence, and were ushered en masse into the fledgling state’s working class (Svirsky & Bernstein, 1993).

From a decolonial perspective, using concepts that have been developing in recent decades - mainly with Latin American and Southern European origins⁴ - this study will examine some aspects of the political activities of intellectual Sephardic and Oriental Jews. The purpose of this inquiry is to recover the elements in their debates that demonstrated resistance to the colonial premise of the Zionist state. For this purpose, political discourse will be examined as it developed over time on the pages of a cultural-political journal in the 1960s.

There has been much research dedicated to studying episodes of Oriental mobilizations (e.g. Bernstein, 1976; Dahan-Kalev, 1991; Lev & Shenhav, 2010; Negri, 2014; Roby, 2015), and there has been some research dedicated to visualizing Oriental acts of everyday resistance and ambivalently subversive discourses (e.g. Hever et al., 2002a). Two comprehensive investigations reviewed the “skeletons of political-ethnic Oriental organizations” (Leon, 2004a), which have accumulated over the course of Israel’s political history (Herzog, 1986; Chetrit, 2004). The existing research regarding organizations and mobilizations has dealt quite centrally with the question of whether or not these groups promoted politics that suggested alternatives to hegemonic Zionist discourse and practices. One could say that this is an underlying question of any study of political activity of Orientals and Sephardim in Israel. As Raz-Krakotzkin (2005) wrote: “the cultural oppression [of Orientals] exposes the contradictions of Zionist consciousness in a way that may generate counter position. This unique position is the potential of Oriental discourse.”

Analyses of alternatives posed to Zionist hegemony have almost always led to the conclusion that Oriental and Sephardic Jews, despite demonstrating political resistance, did not offer any alternatives, since they aimed to gain powerful positions within the Zionist political system, used Zionist terminology, and did not out rightly speak of segregation. This research reopens and continues the former researchers’ inquiries into Sephardic and Oriental political organizations as potentially offering alternatives to Zionist hegemonic political patterns. I argue here that the fact that these organizations worked in order to become incorporated into the state and not in order to dismantle it, as well as the fact that they appropriated Zionist terminology, does not mean that they merely reproduced Zionist logics. When referring to Zionism as a form of colonialism, it is possible to detect decolonial discourses and practices within the autonomous Oriental and Sephardic political activities. Such decolonial proposals can be observed in rhetoric and action that is built upon intercultural perceptions of diversity. Understanding modernity and coloniality as two constitutive sides of the same coin (Mignolo, 2000), leads historical decolonial inquiries to deal with the search for practices and discourses of emancipation that do not rely on modern concepts like liberalism, human rights and multiculturalism (De Sousa Santos, 2006). If Oriental Jews are best analyzed as both colonizers and colonized (Raz-Krakotzkin, 2005; Massad, 2007), the question of their potential to set alternatives to colonial Zionism can be answered primarily by their resistance to playing either role. Therefore, discourse about and relations with Palestinian Arabs and the surrounding Arab states forms a constitutive part in the search for decolonial proposals within the political activity of Sephardic and Oriental Jews.

Next, we will explore and define who the Oriental and Sephardic Jews are and what specific heritages are related to them, eventually constituting them as another diaspora,

⁴These academic debates have been referred to as “the decolonial turn” (Castro-Goméz & Grosfoguel, 2007; Restrepo & Rojas, 2010) or the modernity/coloniality research program (Escobar, 2007).
versus the Ashkenazi Jews. Afterwards the article will be divided into three sections. The first and second sections form the historical background necessary for the sociological analysis presented in the third section. The first section is a historical review of the role the Sephardim played in Eretz-Israel/Palestine, and will analyze how this role transformed from the beginning of Zionist settler-colonization process at the end of the 19th century and until the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. In this section, we will observe how the native Sephardic elites perceived the Zionist project, in response to which they developed an alternative, inclusive, form of Zionism. This form of inclusive Zionism rejected the colonial aspects of the Zionist project while retaining its national aspirations. The second section examines the consequences of the 1948 war on Jews in Muslim countries and on the native elites, as a fracture between them and their environment, the Arab region around them. We will then briefly examine the political response that the native elites developed to the new reality of statehood. The third section is dedicated to the development in Sephardic and Oriental intellectuals’ political activities throughout the 1960s, as evidenced by writings featured in a particular journal. The theoretical perspectives developed in this journal will be examined mainly through the lenses of broader decolonial and anti-colonial theoretical debates. Some aspects of pre-state inclusive Zionism were re-established in this period, but still were not leveraged into political action. Some of the factors that prevented this theoretical debate from becoming formulated into praxis will also be examined. In particular, we will observe how the consequences of the 1948 war prevented these activists/intellectuals from developing what was called, following Spivak’s (1990) arguments, “strategic essentialism”, and therefore they did not formulate strategy nor praxis. The periodization ends with the 1967 war, before the inception of direct military occupation over millions of Palestinian Arab non-citizens.

The central corpus used for the sociological analysis is issues of the periodical “In the Battle”, published between 1961 and 1967. This weekly periodical was published by the Council of the Sephardic Community of Jerusalem from 1961 to 1991, and it was an intellectual stage that, among other things, promoted debates regarding the possibilities of political roles available to be played by the Sephardic elites and the intellectual Jewish immigrants from Islamic countries. “In the Battle” - the organ of Sephardic and Oriental Publics5 - had mainly medium-length theoretical and informative articles about the problems of Oriental and Sephardic representation, along with articles by or about Sephardic lay and religious public figures, and reviews of Sephardic or Oriental customs, heritage, and folklore. The magazine enjoyed wide distribution in circles of Sephardic and Oriental elites as well as Ashkenazi decision-makers (Protocol, 1960; Sofer, 1961). The analysis provided here is also based on daily newspapers; and protocols, letters and publications, mainly of the Council of the Sephardic Community of Jerusalem, but also from other autonomous organizations of Sephardim and Orientals in the 1950s and 1960s in Israel.

1.1 Sephardic and Oriental Jews

Oriental will be used here as a category of identity to refer to all Jews descending from Muslim countries. There exists a complicated relationship between the categories of Oriental and Sephardic which will be examined below. In different contexts, either the term Sephardic or Oriental can in fact encompass the entire population of non-Ashkenazi Jews.

The category of Sephardic has a clear historical basis. Sepharad (sfarad) is the Hebrew name for Roman Hispania, Muslim Al-Andalus and modern day Spain. Though Jews inhabited the Iberian Peninsula since the 3rd century (Weksler, 2005), the last seven centuries they spent in the Peninsula so greatly charged their historiography that the term ‘Sephardism’ has been

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5 Ba-maarakhah bitaon ha-tsibur ha-sfaradi ve’edot ha-mizrakh.
coined and analyzed across its various spatial, temporal and subjective contexts (Halevi-Wise, 2012; Evri, 2013). The myth of harmonic co-existence between the three monotheistic religions in Al-Andalus has made Sephardic history a useful metaphor for a variety of artists, and a source of inspiration for academics concerned with peace and war, identity politics and international reconfigurations, from the 18th century onwards (Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2000; Aizenberg, 2005; Halevi-Wise, 2012). For world Jewry, Sephardism provokes the imagery of the Jewish Golden Age, a period of remarkable intellectual, artistic and religious creativity. As of the mid-11th century, Sepharad surpassed Babylonia as the center of Jewish rabbinic life (Hakfir, 2014), and foundations were established there that were instrumental in later developments in Judaism (Bineart, 1992). The Medieval Sephardic aesthetic and knowledge productions corresponded extraordinarily with the language, content, forms and genres of the Arab cultural bloom of that time and place, built upon rationalist and humanist Muslim, Persian and Greek ideals (Yosef, 1991; Asis, 1991; Bineart, 1992; Tübi, 2011).

After their 1492 expulsion from the Iberian Peninsula, Sephardic Jews took up prominent roles within different Jewish communities across the Mediterranean (David, 2005; Bunis, 2005). In the northern reaches of the Mediterranean Ottoman Empire, the native Jewish communities were assimilated into Sephardic culture and language. With the invention of print, Sephardic became an adjective to particular liturgics, customs and rabbinical authorities (Zohar, 2001), probably due to the proliferation of a prayer book (Siddur) that spread across other Jewish communities of the Muslim world (Pedaya, 2015). Therefore, all Jews under Islamic rule could, in different moments or contexts, be seen as belonging to a Sephardic Halachic and prayer tradition (Raz-Krakotzkin, 1994; Pikar, 2003). Other customs and languages varied between Jewries in different parts of the Muslim world. Still, since early modernity, it can be claimed that two branches of Judaism, Ashkenazi and Sephardic, have been evolving; two Jewish heritages that developed distinctly under Christian and Muslim centennial rule (Cohen, 2005).

This claim has been contested by some researchers (e.g. Zohar, 2001; Frenkel, 2015), but still others have tried to define the essential differences between Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jewries (Elazar, 2005; Zohar, 2005; Schorsch, 2012). According to the second group of scholars, the differences are not only marked in liturgy, styles of rabbinical education and some customs, but most importantly in the divergent structures of opportunities created for minorities under Islam versus Christianity. While Islam accepted the rights of other monotheistic religions and allowed them to live in its midst with a special protected status, under Christian rule, Jews remained historically responsible for murdering their savior, and the persecution and humiliation of Jews was much more widespread and recurring. This persecution led to the development of a more introverted and closed Jewish society. As later European modernity developed, significant Jewish movements flourished in Europe, marking clear the differences between Jews under Muslim rule and those living in Christendom. The secularizing effects of the Enlightenment on Ashkenazi Jewish society created a reactionary response among some religious streams that developed radically introverted ultra-orthodoxy. In contrast, in Muslim countries, modernization was not accompanied by brutal hostility towards religious authorities. The respectable stature of rabbis was generally maintained (Zohar, 2001) and reactionary conservative orthodoxy was rare (Leon, 2010). Also, in Europe alone, as a consequence of recurring persecutions, and due to inspirations from the European “spring of nations” and colonialism, Jewish modern nationalism grew and eventually consolidated in the form of the Zionist movement.

Since the establishment of the state of Israel and until the 1980s, Oriental Jews were estimated to comprise about 50% of its Jewish population (Mizrahi & Herzog, 2012). Speaking of ethnic divisions between Jews in Israel has always been a taboo, transgressing the national ethos that perceives the state as the land of all Jews. Therefore, despite the ethnic-
classist reality reflected by statistics, any socio-economic political discourse on Oriental, Sephardic, and Ashkenazi Jews is limited to certain political groups or to the academy, with this ethnic divide forming one of the main pillars of Israeli sociology (Adut, 2006). Descriptions of the heritage of Sephardic and Oriental Jewries has shaped an academic and political perception of these Jewries as carriers of a middle-way, with the potential to deconstruct modern Israeli dichotomies of secular/religious and Jew/Arab. This is another reason that Oriental political discourse and action has been examined sociologically in light of its ability to challenge Zionist hegemony; the first reason being their type of colonial oppression - culturally subjugated but politically included in the Zionist collective (Raz-Krakotzkin, 2005).

Within the study of organizations that either define themselves as Sephardic, or declaratively addressed primarily Jews from Muslim countries, the term “Sephardic and Oriental” has been found most convenient for referring to the entire populations of native Palestinian Jews and Jewish immigrants from other Muslim countries.

2. SEPHARDIC INCLUSIVE ZIONISM 1882-1948

The Council of the Sephardic Community of Jerusalem (hereinafter: CSCJ), was established, according to its own tradition, as early as 1267. Following the 1839 reforms in the Ottoman Empire, the chief Sephardic rabbi of Jerusalem, considered to be the spiritual leader of the CSCJ, assumed the role of representing the Jews in Jerusalem and its surroundings. The Sephardic rabbinical and economic elites of the city were organized within the CSCJ, which served as an administrative and organizational framework for the different tasks this representative role required, from taxation to education and welfare6 (Kerk & Ben-Ya’akov, 1996). Some of these elites were incorporated into the Ottoman administrative bureaucratic system, and some carried out their affairs or their public’s affairs within a framework of “notable politics”. This consisted of non-professional work in administration and governance that relied on their social status and capital - that is, their social, cultural and economic contacts as well as intermediating skills with other elites in the region7, and with the Arab Muslim elites in particular. This circle of notables was educated by various sources, including Arab universities, traditional Jewish religious institutions, and modernized school systems that combined Jewish studies with a secular European education (Levy, 1998; Morag-Talmon, 2000). The Sephardic elites maintained a regional-political hegemony over the non-Ashkenazi Jews in the land, but their prestige went beyond the empire’s borders (Betzalel, 2007). The Sephardic rabbinical elites had certain spiritual-religious authority, corresponding to the sacred and central place of Jerusalem and Eretz Israel in Judaism. This spiritual-religious status was enforced by sending messengers to Asian and North African Jewries to collect tribute to the communities in the Eretz Israel, and to be dispersed among its rabbinical communities (Tubi, 1986; Bar-Asher, 1986).

The important twists in our plot begin in Eastern Europe, towards the end of the 19th century. A series of discriminatory laws and violent riots against Jews in Russia and other countries caused a massive Jewish emigration from the region. A small percentage of these mainly Russian emigrants were influenced by central European Jewish thought. These intellectual tendencies led them to consider immigrating to the ancient land of Zion, known in Hebrew as Eretz Israel. This land was designated in the Old Testament -and in other Jewish scripts- as the land promised to them by God, where a Jewish kingdom had once stood. The military superiority Europe gained over the Ottoman Empire made it physically

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6 The central representation of the Jewish millet in the ottoman empire was in the hands of the Main Rabbi of Kushta, sustained by two committees composed by the Sephardic elites in the empire: a spiritual committee and a worldly one (Bernal, 1986; Campos, 2011).

possible to purchase lands in Palestine and settle them. Jewish capital owners were recruited in order to invest in the Jewish settlement project in Palestine (Pappe, 2006). Thus, Eastern European Jews began settling rural lands and cities in Eretz Israel, as well as consolidating institutions in Europe with the aim of establishing a Zionist movement. The indigenous Arab population was not at all pleased with this Jewish wave of immigrants, due to its declared intention of building a nation state in its land (Lamdan, 1994).

The Sephardic elites, like others amongst the native population, perceived the immigrants’ foreign customs and secular ways of life as threatening (Chelouche, 1931: 45-48; Gorny, 1985; Cohen, 2015). Nonetheless, the project of bringing Jews from everywhere to settle the land, creating a united nation and subsequently becoming the local majority was deemed a desirable aim; Zionism was understood as a method of strengthening cultural, spiritual and economic aspects of the Jewish community in Eretz-Israel/Palestine. For instance, Sephardic activists made great contributions towards popularizing the usage of Modern Hebrew (Aliav, 1982; Campos, 2011). Some of the Sephardic notables understood their role as cultural and instrumental intermediaries between the Jewish immigrants and local populations and authorities. They facilitated Jewish immigration by helping to purchase lands and petitioning the authorities in the immigrants’ favor. However, they could also sympathize with the resentment that the organized ideological immigration raised in the local population. Specifically, resentment on the part of the local Arab elites in the Arab press concerned them greatly. In many respects, the Sephardic notables were complicit to both sides of the developing conflict, acting as “a senior factor, guiding and orientating… influencing both sides from its experience and understanding” (Cohen, 2015). Thus, different Sephardic notables made varying efforts to prevent Zionism from becoming a zero-sum game. As indigenous population who are expert in the region (Chelouche, ibid.: 424-430; Eliachar, 1975), and from a standpoint of great appreciation to Islamic civilization, the native notables advocated for the Zionists to study Arabic language, customs and culture. At times Sephardic notables expressed rejection to the Zionist European - superiority concepts (Gorny, 1985), at other times they pointed out the advantageous modernizing potential of Zionism to the local population (Jacobson, 2011). They promoted cultural integration and co-existence between Jews and Arabs, especially through Arabic, Hebrew and Turkish press, while simultaneously helping the immigrants to purchase and settle lands (Gorny, 1985; Campos, 2010; Jacobson, 2011). Some have claimed that the Sephardic elite developed an alternative Zionism: Inclusive Zionism, distinguished from the exclusive Zionism of the newcomers, who advocated for “Jewish Labor” and dreamed of a socialist society for Jews only. Inclusive Zionism was a result of the Sephardic notables’ local status and life experience: their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, their urban lifestyle and close relations with Muslim notables, their perceived distance from the Zionist European nationalist-socialist ideas, and their complex combined Jewish-Arab identities (Jacobson, 2011).

After World War I, the British took control of Eretz Israel/Palestine, and annulled the CSCJ’s hegemonic status within the Jewish community - a status that had in any case been eroding during the preceding decades (Sharabi, 1984; Levy, 1998; Campos, 2010; Ginio, 2014). The British Mandate officially determined the borders and name of the territory of Palestine. The British also allowed for the establishment of institutional foundations for a Jewish-Zionist state. The official representation of Jews in Palestine to the imperial authorities was expropriated from the Sephardic leadership and placed in hands of the Zionist movements: first to Zionist leaders in Europe, and only later to the authorities present in Palestine (Haim, 2000). The CSCJ was forced to adjust quickly to this new reality in order to make an appropriate response within the new political order, especially because the CSCJ and
its public now depended on the Zionist institutions for economic and symbolic resources. During the Mandate period, the CSCJ and other notables established various organizations with which to negotiate the terms of the required alliance with Zionist institutions, which eventually took the form of an alliance between non-equals (Morag-Talmon, 1991). The CSCJ retained a certain centrality and traditional prestige within the Sephardic and Oriental organizations, but other organizations took more vital roles in different phases (Levy, 1998; Jacobson & Naor, 2016). The marginalization of the Sephardic and Oriental elites represented a great insult to their previously respected positions: as the native elite of the land, they had expected to be indispensable to the project of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine (Eliachar, 1980: 482-485). This insult, which at its core amounted to the loss of their self-determination, was often critiqued via discourse on Zionist politics in conjunction with the Arabs of the land. During this period, claiming and asserting an intermediary role between Jews and Arabs was an essential element of the notables’ struggle for political status and power (Jacobson & Naor, 2016). Various outbursts of violence occurred between Arabs and Jews under the British Mandate. Such violent incidents strengthened the Sephardic notables’ grievances and accusations regarding the failure of Zionist politics, and further asserted the need to cooperate with Arabs and foster mutual understanding and respect between the populations (Chelouche, 1931; Eliachar, 1975: 22-25; Alboher, 2002: 171-178). In 1929, massacres of Jews took place in mixed cities inhabited by many Sephardic and Oriental Jews. Such events contributed to the strengthening of Oriental and Sephardic Jews’ identification with the Zionist movement, in Palestine and in other Arab countries (Cohen, 2013; 2015). The massacres initiated a gradual process of segregation between the everyday lives and living arrangements of the native Jews and Arabs (Klein, 2014), contributed to the difficulties of the CSCJ in raising funds in the Arab states (Haim, 2000), and led more Sephardic and Oriental individuals to join the Zionist national defense forces, mainly for the purposes of intelligence gathering and sabotage (Cohen, 2015; Jacobson & Naor, 2016). Espionage and intelligence were other ways in which native Jews used their Jewish-Arab identities and contacts with Arabs in the region for intermediary purposes with the Zionist leadership. For many, this kind of intermediary activity did not contradict the continuing advocacy for Jewish-Arab rapprochement in cultural, socioeconomic and political areas (Jacobson & Naor, 2016). This advocacy also evolved in its arguments and foci: as Jewish and Arab economies were becoming increasingly segregated, more Sephardic and Oriental initiatives aimed to foster economic cooperation between Jews and Arabs in Palestine and with Arabs in neighboring countries as well (Alboher, 2002). The Sephardic notables’ claim of expertise in regards to the Arab world changed its nature, and their skills and contacts were instead funneled towards mediation efforts in Zionist-Arab relations, rather than gaining them a leadership role, as it had under the Ottoman regime (Evri, 2015). Their demands tended to be directed at the responsibilities of the Zionist institutions, and in raising public awareness to the possibility of co-existence, rather than leading to an alternative praxis (Chetrit, 2001).

Since the mid-1940s, Zionist institutions expanded their patterns of co-optation of the Sephardic notables. Sephardic organizations and individuals were included in the Zionist institutions, especially in roles dealing with Zionist politics concerning the Arab population of the land. To varying degrees of emphases, these roles combined economic and cultural politics of rapprochement with security related work. During this period, Zionist politics
walked a narrow line between fostering Jewish-Arab relations and taking advantage of these relations for security purposes. This narrow line consisted mainly of Oriental working class immigrants and some Oriental and Sephardic notables’ key activists. Still, Sephardic and Oriental notables criticized the Zionist leadership for excluding them from decision-making procedures on Arab issues, thereby preventing them from making any improvements in Jewish-Arab relations (Jacobson & Naor, 2016). This criticism derived from the often symbolic and subjugated manner in which most Sephardic and Oriental individuals were incorporated into the Zionist institutions: integration usually depended upon their acceptance of the paradigms that the institutions had already set (Haim, 2000).

3. 1948: WAR, FRACTURE AND IMMIGRATION

From the end of 1947 and until the Autumn of 1948, war raged between the Zionist armed forces, Palestinian-Arab armed forces and the armies of the surrounding Arab countries. The 1948 war resulted in the creation of the State of Israel - a new geo-political entity whose existence erased Palestine from the map. This erasure was accompanied by the disintegration of Palestinian Arab social and political structures and many casualties on both sides, in part due to massacres of civilians. 75% of the Palestinian Arab population became refugees, and subsequently sought shelter in refugee camps in the surrounding Arab countries (Pappe, 2006). As soon as the war ended, Palestinian refugees began attempts to infiltrate the newly drawn borders in order to return to their villages, harvest their crops, or take revenge in form of murder or theft. Israel adopted an uncompromising militaristic stance against these infiltrations, which soon led to the establishment of a reprisal policy, i.e. sending troops to infiltrate the borders and kill civilians of the other side. Such actions led to further deterioration of Israel’s relations with its Arab neighbors (Morris, 2000).

When the nature and magnitude of the Jewish Holocaust in Europe was revealed in early 1940s, the Zionist movement’s leadership realized that the reserves of immigrants it had counted upon to populate the Jewish state were being exterminated. It was then that the movements’ attention became directed towards Jews in Muslim countries as a new potential source of immigrants. (Shenhav, 2006). The 1948 war formalized and exacerbated hostility towards Jews within Muslim regimes and Arab populations. This hostility was further encouraged by the presence of Zionist agents’ in these countries. These agents encouraged immigration in various ways, thus strengthening the ties between Zionism and the Jews living in these countries, and emphasizing the distinction between them and their compatriots (Chetrit, 2009). After the war, Jewish immigrants from Muslim countries arrived to Israel in massive waves, in most cases practically depleting their former Muslim homelands from any Jewish presence at all. This process has been described as a violent tear or fracture of these Jews away from their native lands, accomplished by means of sometimes formal collaborations, and at other times, structural complicity between Zionist and Arab nationalist movements (Shohat, 1999; Ben-Dor, 2004; Snir, 2006; Behar, 2007).

The Zionist leadership, which now constituted the state’s ruling political party, Mapai, also feared the mass immigration of Jews from Muslim countries. The immigrants were perceived by the state as primitive, backwards, and as needing to dispose of their previously established mental constructs and traditional ways of life in order to assimilate into the modern-western nation state. Zionist leaders feared that this immigration would be damaging to the cultural and spiritual attainment of the state. These fears and colonial conceptions were translated into public policy by way of insensitive absorption and socialization policies, which abruptly dismantled the centuries’ long civilizations of the Jews in Muslim countries,

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11 The great masses, about 680,000, arrived in 1948-1951, about half Ashkenazi/Oriental. After that the immigration was always of a substantial Oriental majority. By 1955 approximately 80,000 more arrived (Lissak, 1999).
from the grand structural level to the most intimate facets of life (Shenhav, 2006; Chetrit, 2009).

In years past, much research has been dedicated to demonstrating how these Orientalist frameworks led to brute inequalities in the allocation of state resources that would greatly impact generations to come (e.g. Deshen, 1986; Shohat, 1988; Svirsky & Bernstein, 1993, Svirsky, 1995; Kazzoum, 1999; Hever et al., 2002; Shenhav, 2006; Cohen, 2006; Yonah et al., 2013). Jewish immigrants from Muslim countries went through a much more difficult absorption process than Jewish immigrants from Europe. They usually lived in transit camps the state established for much longer periods of time and their permanent housing arrangements were delayed, were more frequently relocated to the periphery, and remained unemployed or were diverted to blue collar industries or physical labor (Shapira, 2012). Because Oriental Jewish immigrants were often relocated to the new frontiers, they suffered most of the casualties and property damage from the Palestinian Arab refugee resistance (Morris, 1997). In order to bolster this suffering population, a new white-collar class of social workers, educators and public servants developed, mainly from within the veteran Ashkenazim (Svirsky & Bernstein, 1993). Varying efforts, which unfortunately included all imaginable atrocities, were made by the state apparatuses to “save” these “underdeveloped” children from their fates. Such efforts included different methods of disseminating secular Ashkenazi education on Oriental immigrants’ children. Most of these efforts were undertaken as part of the Zionist ethos of ‘Merging the Diasporas’, bolstering the perception of Israel as the place where all Jews must gather in order to create a united nation. The state’s institutional practices fulfilled this ethos as a technical mission, left to the hands of clerks and social scientists, who were entrusted to bring about the modernization and reeducation of immigrants from Muslim countries, in closer alignment with the prevailing hegemonic Ashkenazi Zionist identity.

While this wide-reaching colonial process caused a spiritual-cultural identity crisis that was hard to detect and even harder to combat, it also created socio-economic inequalities and institutional discrimination that were easier to distinguish and resist. The 1950s saw the rise of protests of varying natures among Oriental immigrant communities, be it those living in transit camps, development towns or poor neighborhoods in cities. These protests, which sometimes turned violent, clearly demanded the provision of basic necessities and rights for Oriental Jews: employment, housing, the right to choose where to live, and improved conditions in the transit camps and in government arranged projects; however, long-lasting organizations with greater impact were not formed out of these initial protests (Lehman-Wilzig, 1992; Chetrit, 2004; Roby, 2015).

In Jerusalem, the 1948 war brought a sudden and decisive end to any personal contacts and shared living between Jews and Arabs. The city was divided between Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan, leading to mass relocations of populations from both sides of the city. Since more Orientals lived in what became Arab district (Gaon, 1937; Jacobson & Naor, 2016), this relocation hurt the Oriental population the most. The CSCJ lost more than half of its properties, including the most historically significant and cherished ones (Memorandum, 1949). Many of its benefactor became refugees, while CSCJ members themselves lost private property and entire family inheritances. Personal and business relations between the Jewish and Arab populations in Jerusalem were cut entirely, and the

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12 By the end of 1950 about 80% of the transit camps inhabitants were from Arab countries, by 1953 it was already 90% (Segev, 1984). This despite being 14-37% of all immigrants in 1948 and 1952 (Tzur, 1995). The transit camps were mostly terminated by 1960, though some continued to exist until mid-1960s (Segev, 1984).

13 Here I refer mainly to the kidnapping of and medical experimentation on Oriental children, especially of Yemenite origins; and the withdrawal of information about these practices until nowadays. See Shovali (2007).

14 Development towns were built throughout this period, sometimes next to the transit camps, as the permanent settlement arrangement mainly for immigrants from Arab countries. Towards the end of the period factories were constructed in their areas (Shapira, 2012), so that these towns still consist of the country’s poorest working class areas.

city became isolated from its “economic and financial home front and base” (Eliachar, 1954) - the surrounding Arab villages and cities. The process leading up to statehood and the final establishment of the state caused financial ruin for the CSCJ, but this issue was never the subject of protest. The project of the Jewish state included significant political privilege for the notables of the CSCJ. After the state was established, and for the first time in its centuries’ long history, the CSCJ was operating in a Jewish city. For an ethnic minority group that had always struggled against majority groups and governments for appropriate representation, this change was momentous; it meant that they had finally cemented their positions as part of the ethnic ruling elite (Elmaliah, 1949). They hoped that within the new state, “a Jewish hegemony of all the tribes and not just one” (Eliachar, 1950) would rule. However, these hopes proved misguided. Zionist institutions would only agree to support Sephardic and Oriental organizations as subjugated groups. The new political reality that emerged assigned all community matters and diplomatic exchanges to state mechanisms. The politics of the Sephardic notables were rendered largely irrelevant, as was their role as intermediaries between Jews and Arabs (Jacobson & Naor, 2016). After 1948, as a result of being trapped in the zero-sum game it had tried to prevent, the CSCJ lost much of its symbolic status and economic resources.

Nonetheless, the establishment of the state aroused great hopes for this centuries’ old minority group, which had until now operated under foreign rule (“Itamar Ben Avi”, 1949). The problem was that gaining inclusion in the ruling majority also meant accepting weakness, dependence and marginalization, in addition to the insult of having their native rights revoked by European immigrants (Manifesto, 1948). In an attempt to regain political power, the CSCJ established a political faction intended to win over the votes of immigrants from Muslim countries and attain positions for the native elites in the state through established parliamentary procedures16. They supported their claim with the notion of a Sephardic and Oriental collective identity that the CSCJ would represent, based on earlier imaginings of a Sephardic and Oriental Diaspora that held the Sephardic community of Jerusalem as a spiritual base, versus a European Diaspora (Noy, 2014).

Since the Sephardic notable politics no longer played the role of intermediaries between the Arab world and the state, their pre-statehood claim morphed after 1948 into a new desire: to intermediate between state institutions and Oriental immigrants from Muslim countries. However, this was not a legitimate aim in the new Israeli reality: the CSCJ as an organization was not capable of absorbing the multitudes of lower class immigrants, seeing as most of their community leaders and notables had not immigrated to Israel17. The CSCJ simply did not have the social contacts or skills to establish legitimacy among the masses of impoverished immigrants. The honor-politics that had formerly constituted the base of the notable regime was no longer relevant to the ethos of the modern-western democracy that Israel was forming. From the perspective of the marginalized Sephardic community, liberal democracy was based on a “wretched disease from the West: the sickness of political parties” (Third Meeting, 1950). Moreover, the perceived inferiority of the Oriental immigrants by the Zionist ruling elites created a racial divide that the Sephardic elite refused to be contaminated with. And so, as the Oriental immigrants were being stereotyped increasingly negatively within the ruling discourse, the CSCJ elite circles similarly nurtured a feeling of superiority over them (Peretz, 2000). Between the immigrants of Muslim countries and the Ashkenazi elites, the CSCJ notables preferred to identify with the latter, even as they maintained a defiant discourse towards the establishment. These factors prevented the CSCJ from reaching out to their public: immigrants from Muslim countries. By 1955, during the

16 In 1949 the faction was formed with other Sephardic elites, mainly of the Haifa and Tel Aviv Councils of Sephardic Community. These institutions quit politics in 1951, and the CSCJ continued its work as an autonomous faction inside the General Zionists party until 1955.

17 This is why much of their work in the parliament, particularly of Eliahu Eliachar, was aimed at advancing the immigration of the Oriental elites. E.g. “The Subcommittee” (1953).
new states’ third elections, the Oriental faction lost all parliamentary representation and withdrew from official politics.

4. THE THEORY OF AUTOCTONOUS ZIONISM OF THE 1960S

By 1960, there were dozens of autonomous local organizations of Sephardim and Orientals, natives and immigrants that provided cultural and educational activities, mutual social aid and religious services. These organizations were usually formed by specific communities, according to their communal origins and current places of residence\(^\text{18}\). Organizations of Oriental natives and immigrants were more often than not separate (Report of Investigation Committee, 1959). Some organizations attempted to form nation-wide coalitions for specific professions (‘Abbas, 1958) or places of origin (“Committee of Twelve”, 1958).

Bernstein (1976) described in detail the relationships between these self-help organizations and the Ashkenazi Zionist political parties, and the different oppressive and exploitative means that parties took to annul Oriental autonomy. Any emergent Oriental leaders got drawn into different parties, to act in them only as “votes’ brokers” (Lissak, 1972) with no actual influence within the parties’ mechanisms (Chetrit, 2004)\(^\text{19}\). Some parties made ethnic lists composed of immigrants from specific Muslim countries of origin. Most immigrants tended to vote for these protégé ethnic lists (Deshen, 1970; Lissak, 1972). In some localities, the protégé lists rebelled and protested, creating their own independent lists and used these to attempt to gain better positions in their parties (‘Abbas, ibid.; “Tisat ha-sfradiim”, 1958; “We got united”, 1961). In this manner, the decade of the 1960s witnessed a gradual increase in representation of Orientals and Sephardim within Zionist parties, mainly in local environments, such as workers’ organizations and municipalities (Deshen, 1970; ‘Abbas, ibid.). The retirement of the CSCJ from parliamentary politics created new opportunities within the political structure for younger Sephardic and Oriental generations to fill (Cohen-Tzidon, 1956). Several new representative initiatives emerged, seeking to represent the Oriental and Sephardic populations on local and national scales (Misles, 1961).

The CSCJ was consciously searching for routes by which to gain greater influence and become a functioning extra-parliamentary lobby. One of the strategies explored was the establishment of a journal in 1961 called “In the Battle” (hereinafter: IB), known as The Organ of the Sephardic and Oriental Publics. The IB was mainly an intellectual platform. It promoted debates on the correct terminology with which to discuss the problems of the Sephardim and Orientals in the state, as well as debated the most critical needs of the community. This second debate usually led to the conclusion that the greatest need was for increased Sephardic and Oriental representation in elected state institutions. The IB also pursued cultural endeavors, such as the publication of reviews of Sephardic and Oriental customs, heritage, and folklore.

Some political activists believed the IB should be dedicated to reestablishing the pre-1948 claim of the Sephardic and Oriental’s role as intermediaries between Jews and Arabs and for advancing Israeli - Arab rapprochement (Cohen-Tzidon, 1963b). Thanks to the contributions and inspiration of these activists, the IB also developed as a platform to discuss theoretical and practical suggestions for an alternative to the animosity, hatred and condescending attitudes Israeli society held towards the Arab world. The writing in the IB was often intertwined with denouncements of public policies that required that Oriental immigrants shed their Arab cultural baggage. This critical discourse was developed by the

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\(^{18}\) For instance, in Haifa in 1959 there were nine such Sephardic and Oriental registered organizations (Nachmias & Spiegel, 2009: 113). For an example of cooperation between old timers and immigrants: Shavit (1958).

\(^{19}\) Purchasing votes, for instance, seems to have been a regular practice. See Report of Investigation Committee (1959).
older generation of native activists and within intellectual immigrants. It did not develop as much within the younger native generations:

“The youth that grows up in Israel does not better absorb either understanding or knowledge of what is happening around us, and in the day that the desired peace will come, we will lack this priceless baggage [mit’an yakar] for good neighboring relations with the peoples fate had assigned us to live by.” (Eliahu Eliachar to David Sitton, 1963)

The “priceless baggage” of knowledge, and subsequent appreciation of Arabic language and cultural productions held great political value for the older native and immigrant intellectuals. It helped them to effectively confront the establishment’s attempts to undermine the political value of Sephardic and Oriental Jewries. For instance, a common Ashkenazi discourse was the justification of Ashkenazi domination by conjuring anxiety and fear of the “levantization” of Israel: the possibility that if Orientals and Sephardim had real power, the state would be assimilated into an Arab domain and “would not have value for the Jewish people” (David Ben Gurion to Moshe Chelouche, 1962). Younger native activists countered this argument by circumventing it, and demonstratively highlighting distinctions between Oriental Jews and Arabs (“hamehumot ve-hatkhakhim”, 1962). In contrast, some of the older natives and immigrant intellectuals used this ‘baggage’ to make comprehensive arguments against the Ashkenazi claim (Sitton, 1958; Cohen-Tzidon, 1962; Eliachar, 1967; “The Millennium”, 1965). They presented the intrinsic relationship between the project of empowerment of the Oriental and Sephardic publics - the need for the Ashkenazi state to develop a tolerant attitude towards the Orient - and Israeli-Arab rapprochement:

“The Jews of the Orient have adapted a special way of life through which they could accomplish co-existence with the Arabs for many generations. When they felt estranged in this country [zarutam ba-aretz] they tried to adapt the same way of life with the Ashkenazim, of course with less success. The disrespect [zilzul] did not persecute them in the Muslim countries, but in the land of the Jews [erets ha-yehudim] it persecuted them into their intimacy ['ad le-hadrei hadarim] … Now people begin to study their past, learn about what happened to them in Israel [ba-arets], and to express their feelings [rahashei libam] and respond on press to the said and written about them and against them…the burden of prejudice within, indicates [noten ototav] the exterior policy.” (”al nehashalim ve-koshlim”, 1967)

Unlike Marxist conceptions of Jewish-Arab fraternity, the IB contributors wrote about Jewish-Arab rapprochement as an internal-Jewish process, and not one based on practical cooperation with Palestinians or any other Arabs. More than a process, in fact it was an ethos they developed in order to impose on the nature and image of the state. This ethos was based on conceptions of Jewish Redemption, and proposed a profoundly different vision for the state. It directly confronted the issue of the purpose of the Jewish people in inhabiting their land and the role that the Jewish state should play in the future of the Middle East. In short, it was an alternative Zionist theory (“Memorandum”, 1966) for the establishment of Israel as an “Oriental country”20.

This alternative Zionism, which here we call autochthonous Zionism, was based on the same premises of pre-1948 Inclusive Zionism, and had some of the same formulators. This alternative Zionism developed through comprehensive critical thinking that tied several

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20 Efron (2005) wrote about Egyptian and Iraqi intellectuals in Israel, such as Jacqueline Kahanoff, Sami Michael and Nissim Rejwan. These intellectuals wrote in literary publications, daily newspapers and parties’ organs; about similar themes as the ones reviewed here, and from a similar position of natives of the region. They all wrote in order to achieve public legitimacy to their interpretation about the desired character of the state. The public influence the IB tried to achieve by its very existence, these individuals tried to achieve by themselves. Nissim Rejwan and Aharon Zamir are the only one of Efron researched that consistently contributed to the IB in periods.
epistemological, ontological and political questions together. For instance, some authors in the IB appealed to the political project of knowing the special values, culture, and heritage of Oriental and Sephardic Judaism. Others simply recorded its contents: folklore, customs, rabbinical productions and history. The project of producing knowledge on Oriental and Sephardic Jewries was seen as a similar identity-related spiritual-cultural political project - spreading knowledge about the Arab world. It confronted the external and internal nature of the state: the nature of the Jewish people, its mission at that place and time, and its relationship with the Arab world. The writers of this ethos conceived of themselves as “natives to the region” (Alpert, 1966), as opposed to Ashkenazi Jewry. In their writings, proposals were made for the construction of an autochthonous nationalism, which rely on biblical references and the glory of the Judeo-Spanish Golden Age (Rivlin 1962; Rejwan, 1966). This idea was expounded in the writings of several authors, but its most eloquent supporter was Yitzhak A. Abadi, for whom Oriental and Sephardic political activists from different organizations advocated to become President:

“[There exists] a deep psychological abyss between us and them...understanding the abyss... would require from us a deeper and wider change, not only in our attitudes towards the Arab world, to the Arabs as humans, to the Arabs as our closest neighbors... but also to our very mission in this part of the world. This is the kind of change that in itself requires a spiritual rebooting of systems [shidud maarkhot ruhani]...what does the Israeli child know about the Arab world, its language, lifestyle, ambitions, culture...this is required in order to design citizens that are loyal to their people and land with a Jewish consciousness...”. (Abadi, 1962)

“In such a [historical] view, spiritual and cultural Jewish-Arab cooperation will not be seen as utopian and consisting of false dreams, but rather as the force of history... We seek [hotrim] to create an original culture of our own, and such culture will not be real [lo yehe ba mamash] if it does not evolve [tinak ve-tizon] from its natural ground [adama]. Such natural ground is in the Middle East, that is all Arab, and is also seeking [hoter] to design itself new tools of culture and spirit instead of using yesterday’s tools that go and sink in forgetfulness [holkhim ve-metuba'im be-yam ha-shikheha]. What, then, is more understandable and logical than cultural and spiritual cooperation between us and them...we do not have any passion to copy and imitate to our country’s values from others that do not fit our national character. But obviously, we do not have any desire, or ability, to stand for long as an isolated island distinct from its entire environment and... pretend it simply does not exist...In our press, the president of Egypt will never be mentioned in his title, President of Egypt...but [just] in order to emphasize his supposed tyranny. Who are we trying to cheat?” (Abadi, 1965)

The above quote criticizes hegemonic Zionist discourse for misrepresenting and underrepresenting the Arab world in its totality. In other places as well, the discourses of politicians and the media, as well as the study of the Arab world in academia, were undermined as unprofessional and erroneous in aims (Sitton, 1958).

4.1 Merger of Diasporas as an Ecology of Knowledges

The very same claim that was made about the academic study of the Arab world was made about the hegemonic Zionist discourse about the Orientals. It was being debated and reformulated by Ashkenazi “educators, ministers, politicians, writers, sociologists and journalists”

21 In Israel the President is a symbolic-diplomatic role, while the Prime Minister holds the primary executive power.
The 1960s were marked by a growing "academization" of the ethnic divide in Israel, especially in spheres in which Ashkenazi social scientists held prominence, through academic conferences and articles aimed at influencing public policies. The Ashkenazi scholars did not seek to benefit from the knowledge of the Sephardic and Oriental intellectuals, notables and activists who had been dealing with these questions in the public sphere. Via publications of the IB and other means, the CSCJ sought to divert the direction of knowledge production. The IB was not ultimately successful as a tool with which leaders might "solidify this public" (Sofer, 1964), but the journal did succeed in establishing a Sephardic and Oriental ivory club - a live alternative to the ivory-towers of the academics, but without a scientific academic seal. This figurative 'club' was a safe zone, where theories could incubate without having their epistemic bases undermined (Ma’as, 1963).

Scientific conferences and publications addressing the Israeli ethnic divide were sources of continuous dispute within the IB. Debates ensued regarding their scientific validity, underlining motivations and the general value they offered to society. "...The failure of these scientists to keep abreast of modern sociological thought, or to pass these findings on to political and administrative circles in the country, is a major cause of the present gloom of the communal situation in Israel. Their attempts to understand the communal confrontation are erroneous, superficial and evasive...and constitute a circular argument". ("Israeli Sociology", 1965) "An investigative approach, which includes theoretical [Halakhtiyot] categories established by the majority, instead of practical categories... merely gives a diagnosis in a superficial, ornate [melitizi] and declarative manner and does not speak about treatment". (Yishai, 1963)

Critics of this school of thought wrote about how the academic discourse, which evolved in other public spheres throughout the 1960s, was impractical, damaging, establishing racist categories ("Facing the Ashkenazi Revolution", 1964; Elihau Eliachar to Ma’ariv editor, 1965; Oron, 1966; Eliachar, 1967: 3, 9-18), reverting to debates that the Sephardic and Oriental elites had already exhausted, and over “clarifying the terms and defining goals” (“berei ha-'itonot”, 1963)23. This scientific production of knowledge had no connection to the Ashkenazim’s required task: to “turn down their arrogant tones [ton ha-yohara]” (Eliachar, 1967: 15) and uproot their “pretentious dispositions [hilchei ruah]” (Eliachar, 1967: 23), and adopt a tolerant, egalitarian and flexible attitude, in order to become one people in the land (Eliachar, 1963). This process would require Merging of the Diasporas, a national ethos required for the project of the construction of the Jewish state. However, this project was not understood the same way from the East and West. For Ashkenazim, it was understood as the project of modernizing Oriental Jewries, while Sephardim and Orientals had quite a different vision. Popular and intellectual, liberal and conservative, Sephardic and Oriental organizations and activists all appropriated the Zionist ethos of the Merging of the Diasporas as necessitating a mutual effort. In this process, both populations “learn from one another, merge into each other and do not cancel out one in favor of the other” (Shimoni, 1963). This understanding of the meaning of the Merger of Diasporas is what united Oriental and Sephardic activists in all spheres of activity24. Many researchers saw the Oriental discourse on the Merging of the Diasporas as expressing dependence on Ashkenazim (e.g. Herzog, 1986; Morag-Talmon, 2000). However,

22 That means, to encourage Sephardic and Oriental scholars to produce knowledge about their own societies, in order to influence Ashkenazi public and academic spheres. Another project of the CSCJ was the construction of an "institution for communal relations" that would possibly also serve as an archive of the CSCJ’s activity and function as a sort of alternative academic institution to investigate Oriental and Sephardic heritages. Elihau Eliachar to Mr. Nurock (1966); “Work Plan” (1963). About the IB as tool for public work see, Protocol of Executive Committee (1965).

23 For instance, in Shevet va’Am and other publications.

24 That is, except for some of the ones that were consistent in Ashkenazi parties. About the popular counter-hegemonic framing on the Merger of Diasporas see Peres (1976: 100); and in political activity: Lissak (1972).
those activists whose background and social class enabled them to integrate this vision within a broader geo-political perspective\textsuperscript{25}, and make an explicit connection between the ethos for the Merging of the Diasporas and the Arab world, did develop an autonomous voice.

This autonomous thinking presented the Merger of the Diasporas as a project which manifested what De Sousa Santos called “the ecology of knowledges”. Superficially, the ecology of knowledges could be interpreted as the popular Sephardic and Oriental aspiration of taking the best aspects of each community, and merging these qualities into one harmonious Israeli identity. However, as De Sousa Santos (2007) pointed out, mere recognition of cultural diversity does not equal recognition of epistemological diversity. The ecology of knowledges is based on a principal that sees all systems of knowledges as incomplete on their own - this includes science as well as more symbolic universes and wisdoms. Ecology stands for the possibility of the existence of indestructible relationships between systems of knowledge (De Sousa Santos, 2006), not as abstract theories but rather as knowledgeable practices. Ecology of knowledges is reflected in the process of developing strategies which carefully select the body of knowledge most likely to successfully resolve a particular issue (such as the Merge of Diasporas) rather than blindly privileging scientific knowledge simply because of its lofty position in the power structure (De Sousa Santos, 2007). Unlike the search for harmonious relations between communities, this school of thought is interested in identifying the lacunae that exists in every form of knowledge, and then supplementing these weaknesses with complementary aspects from other forms of knowledge. The monoculture (De Sousa Santos, 2006) of Ashkenazi scientific knowledge about Jews from Muslim countries and about the Arab world was contested in the debates in the IB for subjective and practical reasons - in fact, the same reasons De Sousa Santos pointed out. In the 1960s, an ambition was formulated in the IB for the creation of an intercultural state, which would be nurtured by ecologies of Ashkenazi, Sephardic, Oriental and Arab knowledges. No one type of knowledge was discarded or adopted in its totality: the Ashkenazim brought late-modern technological developments, the Sephardim offered the heritage of esteemed early-modern Jewish thought, while the Arabs knew how to combine the two knowledges, enabling them to modernize without losing their identity (Eliachar, 1965; “be-nivheyy ha-statistica”, 1966).

As De Sousa Santos (2006) notes, in order to create a dialogue that nurtures such an ecology, it becomes necessary to first make visible the forms of knowledge that are inferiorized, in order to regain cultural bearings and build confidence in these forms of knowledge. Indeed, the autonomous production of knowledge was central in any Sephardic or Oriental project, and provided a clear starting point for many autonomous organizations at the time, not merely political ones, such as the project of the IB. However, contextualizing this project within the ecology of knowledges - which included teachings from the Arab world - was not easily done; the move had to be formulated with caution and precision\textsuperscript{26}. Hostile and paternalistic attitudes towards the Arab world were not monopolized by Ashkenazi Zionism, but rather were prevalent among different layers of the Oriental and Sephardic populations. The image of the working class Orientals as particularly ‘Arab hating’ was popularized and propagated throughout the media and scientific research (“’edot ha-mizrah”, 1962; Peres, 1976: 93-97). The writers of the IB did not apply the apparent paradox such a tendency might suggest to their conceptualization of the Zionism that should be inspired by the “natives of the region”. Some perhaps dismissed this popularized hatred as ephemeral and relatively esoteric (“’edot ha-mizrah”, 1962). In essence, even if elevated levels of hostility

\textsuperscript{25} As Tsur (2000) suggested, immigrants’ views about the Arab world depended on personal past experiences under Muslim rule. The intellectual elite that wrote about these matters could claim for themselves or for their circles to take power positions in diplomacy. In contrast, organized working class immigrants could not develop this voice because it would not be their autonomous voice.

\textsuperscript{26} For instance, many of those most consistently writing about it, like “Oriental Jew”, used pseudonyms.
existed within working class Orientals towards the Arabs, it still did not constitute a paradox for the inclusive political project of regional-autochthonous Zionism. The view that was developed in the pages of the IB did not perceive Sephardim and Orientals in an essentialist manner.

An essentialist view of identity is sometimes leveraged in identity-politics (Bernstein, 2005). Identity politics demands acknowledgement of the singularity of a groups’ identity, and defines rights that subsequently derive from it. The pages of the IB were not entirely devoid of identity politics or essentialist conceptualizations of Sephardic and Oriental identities, but as ideologies, these did not develop to the extent that other ideas did. For instance, the Andalusian Golden Age was conceived of as the foundation of Judaism at large, to serve as the basis of the state, and not merely as a tool for empowering a distinct Sephardic identity (Cohen-Tsidon, 1963; Rejwan, 1966).

4.2 National Consciousness

The essentialist view of identity used in identity politics, especially in the anti-colonial climate of the 1960s, involved a tendency of the colonized or subaltern subjects to glorify the inferiorized culture as superior. This tendency has been criticized for preserving the colonial discourse that imagines colonizers and colonized as essentialist dichotomies, and for merely reversing the Eurocentric colonial logic, rather than challenging or dismantling it. Grosfougel (2010) expressed such ideas about Third World fundamentalism, Fraser (1993) referenced cultural nationalism, Fanon (1963) criticized this tendency of the Negritude movement, while Valdejuli (2007) wrote about nativism.

According to Fanon (1963), and to the intellectuals’ own observations on the working class immigrants, the people who bore the burden of the liberation struggles in practice - those initiating revolts since late 1950s and those practicing acts of everyday resistance (Scott, 1990) - tended towards demagogy based on essentialist nativist perspective (Zamir, 1962; Arditi, 1963): “the emotional if not the logical antithesis of that insult which the white man flung at humanity” (Fanon, 1963: 211). This perspective was held vis-a-vis the Ashkenazim, and perhaps also vis-a-vis the Arabs in the form of vehement Zionism 27. Barely any primary materials have been found that documents such a perspective, and its actual scope in this period is impossible to distinguish, since it was more verbal than textual, according to the secondary resources. From the perspective of our intellectuals, such nativist discourse only endowed the immigrant and native intellectual-activists even more responsibility over the working-class immigrants:

“If a danger is spotted disguised [the Oriental struggle for equality] as a national struggle, those who take care of the issue attempt to divert attention [le-hitrahek] from any such theme”. (“’edot ha-mizrah”, 1962)

We could claim that this lack of nativism denoted a stark contrast between the intellectuals and wider spheres of the politicized public they presumed to write to and about. What is more clear is that autochthonous Zionism and the alternative Merger of the Diasporas projects that were developed in the IB were rarely transformed into concrete demands or actions and were destined to remain principally theoretical debates. The intellectual-autonomous collective identity that was formulated in the pages of the IB did not inspire or relate to any

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27 Different sociologists nowadays have written about Orientals’ hatred for Arabs and tried to explain it from various prisms, also as a way to channel hate and frustration towards the Ashkenazi left. For a review of these explanations see Mizrahi (2011).
practical struggles; it did not designate a route through which to trickle down to society\textsuperscript{28}. Comparing these debates with reflections of the native intellectuals of the time could clarify what factors prevented this discourse from translating into political action.

Fanon (1963) described several different phases in the native intellectuals’ process of formulating the national consciousness. The division into phases has also been criticized (Williams & Chrisman, 1994). It could be claimed that these are not necessarily consecutive phases but rather congruent, and can exist simultaneously even in an individuals’ discourse. According to Fanon, the first phase consists of the native intellectuals’ efforts to prove their ability to assimilate within the colonial culture. The second phase is an essentialist and romantic return to the roots, becoming immersed in the native peoples and abandoning all western knowledge; this phase can generate nativist politics and discourse. The third phase is expressed in literary productions, and aims at “arousing the public” by way of emphasizing their people’s cultural achievements. However, since the intellectual is not truly a part of the common people, Fanon reminds us, he reproduces mainly “exoticism”: in our context, writings about customs and folklore. Such intellectual productions do not reflect the real necessities of the people (Fanon, 1963). While the third phase, as described by Fanon, is very apparent in the discourse developed in the IB, the intellectuals mostly eluded the second Fanonian phase. If there did exist a return to the roots that our native intellectuals imagined, it was to Al-Andalus (Evri, 2016), to the time and place when a glorious Jewish culture flourished, inspired and enabled by its rootedness in the Arab world. That time and place was deemed as directly translatable to their present reality - as a return to the Orient\textsuperscript{29}. Other native intellectuals conceptualized entire civilizations as the basis for their anti-colonial nationalisms, such as Negro-African and Muslim-Arab civilizations (Fanon, 1963). These intellectuals conceptualized The Orient.

“Many find relief to the nerves of the material and spiritual siege held upon us by dismissing the cultural, artistic, moral and historical values of the Oriental man, they dismiss his language, past and worldview. This way estrangement [zarut] and distance grow, and on top of that are added inferiority complexities”. (Cohen Tsidon, 1963)

This quote contains a criticism of the colonial processes that the Orientals have been going through in Israel, along with criticism of Israel’s colonial engagement with the Arab world. In this context, Orientals form part of the colonial matrix of power, both as victims and as a colonizing force. Treating the Orient as a civilizational unit enabled the activists-intellectuals to construct certain continuities between their culture and Islamic civilization, and thereafter to demand respect for both societies.

When attempts were made to translate this comprehensive critique into practical demands, at times these were built upon Arab anti-colonial discourse (Danino, 1959). The intellectuals reclaimed positions of power in circles of Israeli diplomats, as a perceived antidote to the Arab anti-colonial discourse, and as a way to eradicate Israel’s stereotype as an imperialist and colonial force in the Middle East. Other practical demands in the fields of education and housing were voiced against colonial dynamics of “cultural and educational feudalism” (“Benivhey ha-statistica”, 1966), and “Culturecide” (Danger!, 1965; Ya’akov, 1967). There was a selective adoption of various components from Arab or Asian anti-colonial discourses. The claim for the Merger of the Diasporas as an ecology of knowledges was also constructed by

\[\text{The different reasons that can be suggested to this lack of continuance from theory to practice exceed the span of this review. Principally it has to do with the structure of political opportunities in the 1960s in Israel, in which Sephardic and Oriental activists had to be extra cautious not to seem politically opportunistic. If these intellectuals had gotten organized politically in any way, it could have only undermined their claims in this point in time. However, it could also be claimed that the intellectual freedom to write about Israel-Arab rapprochement was to begin with allowed by their lack of intention to take political action with regards. See this caution for instance in: “Danger, Jewish racialism! Israel’s Sephardim: integration, or disintegration?” (1965). Jerusalem: Council of the Sephardi Community of Jerusalem. See Fanon (1963: 223).}

\[\text{Also in these writing there was increasing usage in the adjective Orientali rather than Eastern. This is naturally somewhat ironic when tied up with the Andalusian Golden Age, placed to the West from Israel.}\]
selective - yet eclectic - theoretical perspectives, resulting from the Sephardic and Oriental intellectual’s exposure to and appreciation of diverse intellectual sources. This theoretical perspective was developed by the older generations of native elites, as well as by immigrants who had had the chance to be educated with a diverse array of knowledge, from sources in Arab, Jewish and western environments. However, these theoretical developments did not solidify into justifications for taking practical political action.

Perhaps it was also the avoidance of the second nativist-essentialist phase that created barriers to developing praxis out of this critique. Memmi (1975) also described phases in the construction of anticolonial liberation struggles that were identical to Fanon’s first and second phases. He claimed that the realization of the second phase for the Jews was likely to be expressed through Zionist ideology, and that this is the principal form of Jewish national liberation. Kassab (2009) and Hall (2006) also noted two phases in decolonial cultural critique and in the construction of ethnicity-based politics. In their analysis, the first phase is an elevation of an essentialist identity, whereas later on, wider humanistic critiques develop that include demands for rights for other groups as well. The discourse of autochthonous Zionism that was examined here bears more similarities to this later phase than to the essentialist-nativist phase, although considering Memmi’s suggestions, it could be seen as encompassing both. The alternative autochthonous Zionism tied together the critiques of the subjugation of Sephardic and Oriental Jewries and of Arabs under one civilizational unit of ‘the Orient’, in order to clarify the meaning of and the goals that the Jewish state should pursue in the Middle East.

Spivak (1990) referred to the nativist phase as “strategic essentialism”, which was deemed necessary by various authors for the purposes of constructing a political power to oppose colonialism (Memmi, 1975; Shohat & Stam, 1994; Kassab, 2009). The avoidance of this phase has been implicitly noted by other researchers who explored Sephardic and Oriental mobilizations and organizations. The research tended to dismiss the transformative value of Sephardic and Oriental political activity because they did not seek direct segregation from the Ashkenazim, but rather pursued a strategy of appeasement with the Ashkenazim, with the aim of gaining inclusion in the national collective as designed by Ashkenazi Zionists (e.g. Tsur, 2000; Meir-Glitzenstein, 2009). Here, I suggest that the fact that Oriental and Sephardic political activity was aimed towards gaining inclusion in state institutions does not dismiss the potential transformative value of their discourse. Furthermore, I would suggest that the inability of the political discourse of the time to construct identity-politics separately, or to develop an essentialist-nativist perspective, had more to do with the 1948 fracture than with the desire to gain equality in a pre-established national collective. If Orientals in the state of Israel holds positions both as colonizers and colonized (Raz-Krakotzkin, 2005), it was not necessarily taking the side of the colonizers that prevented them from developing anti-colonial identity politics based on essentialist nativist identity, although that was certainly the case for many organizations. In the case explored here, it was the ontological and physical fracture that occurred to these immigrants and natives in 1948 that prevented their anti-colonial discourse from developing into strategic essentialism. Instead, it turned into a broader humanist critique, meant to design an alternative Jewish collective identity based on spiritual-Oriental Jewish pillars rather than the national- European pillars imported by the Zionist movement.

In his study on the development of the Oriental ultra-orthodoxy in Israel, Leon (2010) claims that the animosity between Israel and the Arab states has constructed mental and physical barriers, which prevent the realization of an Oriental religiosity, imagined within its own roots of Islamic civilization. Therefore, in instances where conservative Sephardic rabbis faced threats to their tradition and status from secular Ashkenazi society, they develop patterns of conservative responses exclusively vis-à-vis Ashkenazi Judaism rather than
through their own traditions. I suggest here that the same physical and mental barriers also prevented the Sephardic and Oriental intellectuals-activists from constructing their own form of nativism. Articulating an essentialist superiority of Sephardic and Oriental Jewries as a whole would necessarily rely on praising the tolerance and grandeur of Islamic civilization. There would be no collective identity of Orientals and Sephardim without Islamic civilization, just as Oriental Jewry would not exist in Israel if it was not for their perceived inferiority in the ruling Ashkenazian discourse. The activists in question were not afraid of pointing out the advantageous characteristics and beauty of Islamic civilizations, and neither of identifying themselves as related to it. However, due to the anti-Zionist exterminatory rhetoric of Arab nationalisms, they certainly could not build an essentialist image of themselves on this civilizational base; after all, Muslims and Jews have declared each other mortal enemies. Specifying the contents of an essentialist Oriental and Sephardic collective identity would inevitably result either in superficiality or praise for those who declared a desire to destroy the Jewish nation. Behar (2007) claims that Zionism contributed to the political segregation of the Middle East on a religious basis, within a structural alliance formed between the Zionist and Arab national movements. Both national currents rejected the legitimacy of the Oriental and Sephardic two-pronged loyalty: nationally and spiritually-religiously Jewish, but culturally tied to Muslim civilization, and therefore also encompassing some of its spiritual components. The conceptualization of Oriental civilization and the Jewish state’s place in it aided in the construction of a comprehensive alternative to the colonial formations of Zionism and allowed it to formulate a nativist approach to the Merger of Diasporas project. It sometimes even translated into concrete demands from the state, but could not inspire much anti-colonial political activity on this basis. In part, this was due to the complex nature of the critique, and that, unlike other anti-colonial discourses of the time, it could not rely on a simplistic essentialist view of the superiority of Oriental and Sephardic identities. Recognizing the unique position of Sephardim and Orientals as both colonizers and colonized contributed to developing the theoretical critique, but did not contribute to expansion of the praxis.

5. CONCLUSION

One might also claim that the Six Day War in 1967 was a main component in preventing autochthonous Zionism from inspiring any political action; and this would not be the first or last time that a war put an end to Orientalist protests in Israel (Herzog, 2005). In late 1966, tensions soared between Israel, the surrounding countries, and the emerging Palestinian Fatah organization. The IB’s contributors maintained almost complete silence regarding the contemporaneous developments in the Israeli-Arab conflict. The fact that Ashkenazi Zionists had succeeded in establishing the state as soon as they did, weakened the Sephardic claim regarding the benefits that could have been achieved had they played a more central role in Arab-Israeli politics (Eliachar, 1964). In the 1960s, this unexplored role was not reclaimed, but rather was abandoned as a mere recollection of diplomatic paths not taken before 1948 (Sasson, 1966). When military combat and exchanges of violence came, autochthonous Zionism had no practical suggestions to offer. There were no critiques of government military policies in the IB, instead such critiques were expressed only in the private spheres (Eliahu Eliachar to Micheal Selzer, undated; Eliahu Eliachar to D. Khazzoum, 1967).

If we can view coloniality and modernity as co-constitutive, as two sides of the same coin (Mignolo, 2000), then in June of 1967, the positive side of the colonial/modern coin, the side alight with the modernity of a democratic nation state with modern military prowess, shined brighter than ever. This allowed the Israeli public at large, including the activists

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30 For more about Oriental ultra-orthodoxy see Leon (1999; 2004b; 2009).
and intellectuals at hand, relief and protection in the face of the Arab rhetoric and goal to extinguish the state. It became apparent that the Merger of Diaspora project as ecology of knowledges was aimed at impeding war; it was not apt for handling it.

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31 See Sh. Cohen Tzidon, Knesset Minutes, 30.5.67.


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